Information security as a prerequisite for the strategic success of military operations:lessons from the Kursk operation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2217.2026.67.100-107Keywords:
information security, Kursk Operation, strategic communications, information silence, OSINT, media space, information warfare, strategic surpriseAbstract
Background. The article examines the role of information security as a strategic instrument for planning and conducting military operations, using the Armed Forces of Ukraine's Kursk Operation (August–December 2024) as a case study. It highlights the importance of balancing society's right to information with information-security requirements in hybrid warfare. The aim is to analyse the mechanisms of information security and the implementation of communication strategies during the preparation and conduct of combat operations, using the Kursk Operation as an example.
Methods. Three complementary methods were applied: normative-documentary analysis of five key legal acts and NATO standards; content analysis of media materials for August–December 2024 (in total, over 40 media reports and more than 15 analytical reports and expert publications were analyzed, drawn from official statements by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian and international media, and Russian propaganda sources); and a comparative method to juxtapose the actual course of combat operations with their media coverage across three segments of the information environment.
Results. Four interrelated dimensions of the problem are analysed: the legal framework (including NATO standards); the structure of the media environment with three target audiences; the preparation phase under a regime of information silence and countermeasures against OSINT threats; and the results of the information campaign after the official acknowledgement of the operation. It is established that the information-silence regime ensured not only tactical success but also the transformation of a local military victory into a significant foreign-policy outcome for Ukraine. The strategy of media isolation deprived Russia of the initiative in the information domain and control over the explanation of events, while securing for Ukraine a the exclusive opportunity to issue the first official statement and control over the global narrative. For international partners, the operation became a basis for reassessing the perception of Ukraine as a state capable of independently planning complex offensive operations.
Conclusions. Information security in modern warfare has transformed into an independent type of strategic armament. Strategic management of information is an integral part of a military operation, in which information silence becomes a weapon and the basis for global recognition of its outcome, achieved through the integration of legal, organisational, and communicative instruments.
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