TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC INFORMATION OPERATIONS AGAINST UKRAINE (2024–2025):THE TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSION AND PROACTIVE RESPONSE MECHANISMS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2217.2026.66.97-103Keywords:
Information and Psychological operations (PSYOP), propaganda, hybrid warfare, disinformation, cognitive resilience, artificial intelligence, national security, narrative warfare, military-strategic advantage, strategic destabilization, information campaigns, strategic communicationsAbstract
Background. Modern information and psychological operations (PSYOP) of Russia have finally transformed from an auxiliary tool into a system-forming element of the art of war integrated into strategic planning. The study fills a critical scientific gap regarding the underestimation of the technological factor of generative artificial intelligence (AI) as a tool of “digital occupation”, which during 2024–2025 became the basis for Moscow's transition to the model of “industrialized disinformation production”. Within the architecture of the Kremlin's hybrid aggression, the information and communication sphere has finally been legitimized as a full-fledged theatre of military operations. The strategic goal of the aggressor has shifted from quantitative indicators of audience coverage to qualitative markers of destruction, namely the artificial provocation of systemic vulnerabilities, paralysis of decision-making institutions, and the purposeful erosion of public consensus on national defence.
Methods. The methodology is based on a systemic interdisciplinary analysis. The case study method was applied to reconstruct the operations "Mapaganda", "Maidan-3" and "Chernobyl provocation". Computational propaganda analysis was employed through the scientific interpretation of digital forensics data from OpenMinds and DFRLab, which made it possible to verify the activity of automated networks. The analytical framework of the study is the "Unified Kill Chain" model, which enabled the structuring of the full cycle of an information attack – from infrastructure deployment to achieving the strategic effect of audience cognitive exhaustion.
Results. It was established that the key element of the Russian strategy was the evolution of the "Maidan-3" operation into a long-term campaign aimed at preparing the "crisis of legitimacy" in May 2025. It was proven that generative AI is used dynamically, adapting narratives to current activities of Ukraine's military-political leadership during specific periods. The phenomenon of "algorithmic terror" was identified, referring to the synchronization of AI attacks with real attacks on the power system to maximize panic. The irrational narrative influence tools used as cognitive noise to mask long-term strategic discredit operations were identified and classified.
Conclusions. The analysis confirms the failure of the current reactive countermeasure model (debunking), since AI attacks provide the enemy with the "right of first impression". The necessity of Ukraine's transition to a proactive model of information and cognitive security based on pre-bunking mechanisms was substantiated. This is achieved by identifying the enemy's technical infrastructure at the stage of its deployment and revealing tactical patterns (TTPs) before the mass injection of disinformation. Only the development of offensive information capabilities and the transfer of cognitive confrontation onto the enemy's territory will make it possible to neutralize the threat of the state's strategic destabilization.
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